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Liquidity traps occur when the natural nominal interest rate becomes negative. In a model 
with capital price dynamics explicitly considered, we find that shocks in the future can 
cause current and lasting liquidity traps. We propose that the central bank can prevent or 
fix liquidity traps by appending to its inflation-targeting monetary policy with a 
prioritized promise to defend a lower bound of nominal capital price. (JEL E31, E43, 
E44, E52, E58, E61, G12) 
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1.  Introduction 
Generally speaking, liquidity traps occur when the economy still has insufficient 
aggregate demand even when the zero nominal interest bound becomes binding. It is a 
widely-held view that Japan has already been trapped; and the United States and West 
Europe are in danger of slipping into one. Motivated by both policy and academic 
interests, much research has been conducted to examine the implications of low interest 
rates and deflation in general, and the prevention and cure of liquidity traps in 
particular—see Buiter (2003); Clouse et al. (2003); Ullersma (2002) for relevant 
literature reviews. 
From a traditional IS-LM perspective, when the zero bound is binding, monetary 
policy will become ineffective; and fiscal policy needs to play a major role in pulling the 
economy out of liquidity traps.  Yet, many authors point out that monetary policy can still 
play a major role in fixing liquidity traps, even when the binding zero bound makes it 
impossible to further reduce the short-term nominal interest rate.  For example, the 
central bank can stimulate aggregate demand through unconventional monetary policy.  
Another popular notion is that inflation expectations can be “managed” to reduce the risk 
of a binding zero nominal interest bound, and lower the real interest rate when the bound 
becomes binding. Also, the exchange rate has been recommended as an instrument to 
rescue the economy from liquidity traps. Finally, the central bank can break the zero 
bound through taxing money.  
Most of the existing research on liquidity traps uses analytical frameworks that do not 
explicitly model capital price and hence misses a simple way of escaping from liquidity 
traps. In this paper we examine how expected capital price depreciation can cause current   - 2 -
and lasting liquidity traps, even when the shock that causes the depreciation is in the 
distant future. Based on the insights provided by our model, we propose that the central 
bank can prevent or fix liquidity traps by committing to defend a lower bound of nominal 
capital price, and prioritizing this promise over its commitment to price stability.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the major 
policy recommendations in the literature on fixing liquidity traps. In Section 3 we first 
diagnose liquidity traps from a capital-price perspective, then based on which propose a 
simple way out of liquidity traps, and compare it to other propositions in the literature. 
Finally, section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  Propositions on fixing liquidity traps: a brief review 
In general, liquidity traps occur when the natural (or equilibrium) nominal interest rate 
(i.e., the nominal interest rate level that balances aggregate demand and supply) becomes 
negative. Before reviewing the major propositions in the literature on the way of escaping 
from liquidity traps, we first provide a brief diagnosis of the occurrence of liquidity traps 
in an illustrative model.  
The demand side of the economy can be modeled by a forward-looking IS curve:  
d
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whereas the supply side captured by an expectations-augmented Philips curve:
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d y  and 
s y are aggregate demand and supply respectively; y denotes output; i and p are the nominal 
interest rate and inflation rate respectively; and 
d ε  and 
s ε  represent demand and supply shocks 
respectively. See Woodford (2003) for detail discussion on the microfoundation of the two equations.    - 3 -
According to equation (2.1) and (2.2), the balance between (aggregate) demand and 
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A negative (or positive)  t Ω  represents the existence of insufficient (or excessive) 
aggregate demand; whereas the equilibrium condition is  0 = Ωt .  
A major task of stabilization policies is to keep demand and supply in balance (i.e. 
0 = Ωt ). For monetary policy, the task is usually accomplished by open market 
operations that keep the nominal interest rate ( t i ) at its natural level (
e
t i ), which, 
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Both demand and supply shocks (
d
t ε  and 
s
t ε ) can affect 
e
t i . As long as the affected 
natural nominal interest rate remains nonnegative ( 0 ≥
e
t i ), the central bank will (in 
principle) have no problem in keeping the nominal interest rate at its natural level (i.e. 
e
t t i i = ) so as to maintain the balance between demand and supply (i.e.  0 = Ωt ).  
However, according to equation (2.4), a negative demand shock ( 0 <
d
t ε ),  if 
sufficiently large (
s
t t t t t t
d
t E y E ε π η σ απ ε − + + − > + + 1 1 ) ( ), can reduce the natural nominal 
interest rate to negative (i.e.  0 <
e
t i ).
2 On the other hand, due to the durability of money—
one dollar of money will always have purchasing power of one dollar—there exists a zero 
bound on the nominal interest rate (i.e.  0 ≥ t i ). Therefore, in the situation where the 
                                                 
2 Certainly a positive supply shock ( 0 >
s
t ε ), if sufficiently large, will have a similar effect. To fix idea, in 
this paper we consider demand shocks only.    - 4 -
natural nominal interest rate becomes negative (i.e.  0 <
e
t i ), the central bank will be 
unable to reduce the nominal interest rate to its natural level; hence the economy will fall 
in a liquidity trap, with insufficient aggregate demand (i.e.  0 < Ωt )  and the nominal 
interest rate on its zero bound (i.e.,  0 = t i ).  
In summary, with a zero bound on the nominal interest rate, liquidity traps will occur 
when the natural nominal interest rate becomes negative. Therefore, to escape liquidity 
traps, either the natural nominal interest rate needs to become nonnegative, or the zero 
bound needs to be broken. Based on this insight, we review the major policy propositions 
in the literature on the way of escaping from liquidity traps. 
A natural question to ask first is whether policy interventions are necessary; in 
another word, whether the economy can practically avoid or struggle out of liquidity traps 
through self-adjustment. According to equation (2.4), a decrease in the current price level 
(i.e. 0 < t π ) can raise 
e
t i  and hence help avoiding liquidity traps.
3 However, 
notwithstanding the downward pressure generated by insufficient demand, price rigidity 
in the short run makes it unlikely to avoid liquidity traps through immediate and 
sufficient price reduction. Deflation in the long run could help the economy to adjust out 
of liquidity traps gradually. However, chronicle deflation can cause deflation 
expectations (i.e.  0 1 < + t t Eπ ), which will dampen demand and may lead the economy into 
a “deflation spiral” (Benhabib et al. 2002). In a word, policy interventions are usually 
necessary to overcome the gravity of liquidity traps. 
                                                 
3 This works from both demand and supply sides. According to equation (2.2), a decrease in  t π  will reduce 
the aggregate supply
s
t y  so as to assuage the problem of insufficient demand. On the other hand, a decrease 
in current price level could stimulate aggregate demand by increasing the real value of consumers’ financial 
wealth (i.e., the real balance effect). Note that the forward-looking IS curve here (equation 2.1) does not 
capture this mechanism.    - 5 -
 
Fiscal policy 
A conventional policy recommendation for fixing liquidity traps is expansionary fiscal 
policies. In essence, fiscal expansions amount to positive demand shocks that could help 
raising the natural nominal interest rate up above zero. Fiscal authorities can boost 
sluggish aggregate demand by increasing their own expenditures, or by putting money in 
consumers’ pockets via bond-financed tax cuts or (with the help of monetary authorities) 
through “money rains”.  
Notwithstanding generally viewed as a sensible prescription, the desirability and 
effectiveness of fiscal polices in fixing liquidity traps (or as stabilization policies in 
general) have been put into question. First, government expenditures intended to 
stimulate demands are prone to inefficiency. Another concern is Ricardian Equivalence 
that could limit the impact of fiscal expansion on stimulating demands (Krugman, 1998). 
By creating purchasing power from the thin air, monetary transfers or tax cuts financed 
by money printing are likely to increase demand (Goodfriend 2000). Yet, political-
economy obstacles aside, this method alone may not be able to accomplish the mission of 
escaping from liquidity traps, because the magnitude of money rain necessary to flood the 
economy out of liquidity traps may intimidate even the most aggressive central banks.  
 
Unconventional monetary policy 
When the short end of yield curves is touching on the ground zero, the long end can still 
have some room to fall. Therefore, with the conventional weapon (i.e. the short-term   - 6 -
interest rate) running out of ammunition, the central bank still has several unconventional 
methods to reduce the long-term interest rate.  
When the zero bound is binding, monetary expansion through open market purchases 
cannot further reduce the short-term interest rate, but merely increase the quantity of 
money held by the private sector. Yet, this “quantity easing” operation could help 
reducing long-term interest rates through portfolio balance effect (Bernanke and Reinhart 
2004). As money and short-term government bonds become perfect substitutes (in terms 
of the store-of-value function) at a binding zero bound, the portfolio-balance impact of a 
change in the ratio between them (with a constant total) may not be significant.   
The central bank can also influence long-term interest rates via directly purchasing 
long-term government securities, or even private-sector assets such as stocks and real 
estate (Clouse et al. 2003; Goodfriend 2000; Meltzer 2001). A downside of this method is 
its tendency to increase the central bank’s direct involvements in financial business and 
hence complicate monetary policy implementation. For example, the loading and 
unloading of private-sector assets on the central bank’s balance sheet will likely involve 
many governance issues (Buiter, 2003).  
Indirectly, the central bank can influence long-term interest rates through a 
commitment to a lasting low-interest policy, such as the zero-interest policy adopted by 
Bank of Japan in 2001. If credible, this policy will help reducing long-term interest rates, 
which can nevertheless remain at a relatively high level due to risk or other premiums.  
In summary, should long-term interest rates have room to fall, properly designed 
unconventional monetary policies will allow the central bank to stimulate aggregate 
demand through reducing long rates. Nonetheless, if the natural long-term nominal   - 7 -
interest rate becomes negative, these unconventional policies will become powerless as 
well.  
 
Management of inflation expectations 
Many authors (e.g. Auerbach and Obstfeld 2003; Eggertsson and Woodford 2003; 
Krugman 1998) point out that monetary policy can fix liquidity traps through managing 
inflation expectations. Equation (2.4) indicates a positive relationship between the 
expected inflation ( 1 + t t Eπ ) and the natural nominal interest rate 
e
t i .
4 Thus, monetary 
policy can fix liquidity traps by inducing higher inflation expectations that could raise the 
negative natural nominal interest rate up above zero. In the same spirit, by targeting a 
relatively high inflation target, the central bank can reduce the risk of liquidity traps 
(Buiter, 2003). 
While there is not much dispute on the notion that high inflation expectations will 
help fixing liquidity traps, a consensus has yet to be reached on whether and how central 
banks can properly “manage” inflation expectations.  
One major issue is how central banks can induce inflation expectation in a situation 
with deflation pressure. Friedman (2003) describes the difficulty in generating inflation 
expectation in liquidity traps as the conundrum of Tinkerbell’s dust. If people believe in 
central banks’ promises on future inflation, inflation will be generated in a self-fulfilling 
process. Yet, if people form their inflation expectations adaptively based on recent 
                                                 
4 On the one hand, higher consumers’ inflation expectations ( 1 + t t Eπ ) will increase aggregate demand by 
reducing the real interest rate ( 1 + − t t t E i π ) and hence put upward pressure on 
e
t i —see equation (2.1). On 
the other hand, a lowered real interest rate tends to reduce aggregate supply through decreasing labor 
supply. Besides, high expected inflations can also reduce aggregate supply by influence relative prices and 
hence firms’ productions.   - 8 -
experience, central banks’ promises on high future inflation will be “spitting in the wind” 
(Buiter, 2003) and hence have no magic power to jumpstart an inflation process.  
More optimistic authors (e.g. Auerbach and Obstfeld 2003; Eggertsson and Woodford 
2003; Krugman 1998) argue that, if the central bank can convince consumers of its 
tolerance to a higher price level in the future (after liquidity traps are over), inflation 
expectation can be established. Intuitively, once consumers expect a higher price level in 
period T, their optimal reactions will lead to a higher price level in period T-1; and then 
raise the price level in period T-2, and so on (Auerbach and Obstfeld 2003). In a word, as 
long as the central bank can convince people that price will eventually go up sometime in 
the future, inflation expectation will be generated.  
However, many authors (e.g. Adam and Billi 2003; Eggertsson 2003; Krugman 1998) 
point out that central banks’ commitment to high inflation is intrinsically incredible, 
because it would be optimal for the central bank to renege after the high-inflation promise 
has helped pulling the economy out of liquidity traps. Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003, 
p.18), on the other hand, do not share this concern, because their analysis shows that the 
central bank’s “acting against a deflationary trend can achieve a substantial welfare gain 
while creating only mild and temporary inflation.” Although the authors’ analysis is 
based on a special model specification,
5 it does help raising a puzzling question: How 
could the credibility of a benevolent central bank ever become an issue?  
                                                 
5 Auerbach and Obstfeld’s (2003) analysis is based on the “inverse wage Euler equation” (i.e. equation (5) 
in the paper) that describes wage dynamics over time in their model. Derived solely from consumer’s utility 
maximization, the equation nevertheless contains no choice variables (i.e. consumption and labor), but only 
wages and interest rates that are taken as parameters by consumers in their utility maximizing calculations. 
Yet consumers’ optimizing behaviors per se are not supposed to put any constraints on these parameters. 
Indeed, the inverse wage Euler equation is a condition for an interior solution to the maximization problem. 
However, due to the linear specification of labor disutility in the model, corner solutions are more general.    - 9 -
The key to this puzzle is that individual rationality does not necessarily produce 
collectively rational outcomes. Even though it is in the interest of consumers for the 
central bank to renege on (rather than sticking to) its high-inflation promise, as long as 
consumers do not believe in the high-inflation promise, liquidity traps, which are 
probably the worst outcome, will be resulted. The reason is that individual consumers can 
hardly realize that their individual spending postponements could aggregately push the 
economy into a liquidity trap. Or even if they do realize it, the market per se provides no 
coordination mechanisms to orchestrate an altogether increase in spending. In a word, the 
high-inflation promise is not credible from an ex ante point of view, even though the 
belief in it would be welfare-improving ex post.   
Even if the central bank can convince consumers of its high-inflation promise, 
managing inflation expectations will be a challenging task. While excessive inflation (or 
price) targets could cause runaway inflation, conservative inflation targets will tend to 
result in actual inflation falling short of the targets. In this respect price-level targeting 
will perform better than inflation targeting (Eggertsson and Woodford 2003; Wolman 
2003). However, price-level targets that systematically overshoot actual prices will have 
difficulties in establishing their credibility. Consumers’ rational expectations will tend to 
take into account the overshooting, which will increase the complexity of central bank’s 
inflation expectation management. 
 
Exchange rate 
Some authors suggest the exchange rate as an instrument to fix liquidity traps (e.g. 
Coenen and Wieland 2003; McCallum 2000; Svensson 2001, 2003). Recall that   - 10 -
downward price rigidity is a key element that prevents the economy from self-adjusting 
out of liquidity traps. Yet the central bank can effectively reduce domestic prices (in 
terms of foreign currencies) through exchange rate depreciation, which can stimulate 
aggregate demand through exports. A problem of this policy is the difficulty in 
depreciating exchange rate when the zero interest bound is binding (Christiano, 2001). 
An undervalued currency will tend to attract demands from those who bet on its future 
appreciation. Under normal situations, these speculative demands can be dampened by 
reduction in domestic interest rates. Yet a binding zero interest bound will make such 
adjustment unavailable. Hence the central bank may have to satisfy a large amount of 
speculative demands on home currency before it can succeed in depreciating the 
exchange rate. With unlimited ability to supply home currency and strong determination 
on depreciating its value, the central bank can eventually scare off speculative demands 
(Svensson 2001, 2003). However, with its beggar-thy-neighbor impacts, exchange rate 
depreciation intentionally designed to jumpstart sluggish domestic economy is also likely 
to jumpstart the money-printing machines of trading partners who want to keep their 
domestic demands intact (Coenen and Wieland 2003; Stevens 2001; Swank 2001).
6 The 
resulting competitive devaluations can make the depreciation attempt very difficult to 
succeed. Also, it will cause instability in the foreign exchange market.  
                                                 
6 For the case of Japan, Svensson (2001) argues that Japan’s trading partners may be willing to coordinate a 
jumpstart mission for future benefits from the imports of a strong Japanese economy. However, there could 
be numerous reasons to expect unsympathetic trading partners against a tradeoff between current pain and 
future happiness. For example, policymakers in the trading partners are likely to hesitate on such a tradeoff 
that may jeopardize their careers. Moreover, trading partners who sacrifice now may not be the ones who 
get the future benefits. Svensson (2003, p. 34) also argues that currency depreciation tends to be a result of 
escaping from liquidity trap, directly or indirectly. Yet we share the opinion of Auerbach and Obstfeld 
(2003) that “incremental market-induced depreciations” would be easier to defend as “a side product of 
domestically necessary policies”.   - 11 -
Svensson (2001, 2003) suggests using a temporary peg (to an undervalued exchange 
rate) to achieve an upward-sloping price-level target path. Thus, the undervalued 
exchange rate in Svensson’s plan can help jumpstarting the economy through both 
foreign and domestic demands. However, as just discussed, trading partners’ reactions 
could make the undervalued peg very difficult to sustain. Besides, the peg will force the 
central bank to raise the nominal interest rate to satisfy the parity between domestic and 
foreign interest rates. If slow adjustments in inflation are not enough to offset the increase 
in the nominal interest rate, the resulting increase in the real interest rate will become a 
force dampening aggregate demand and hence against the intended jumpstart (Swank, 
2001).   
 
Gesell’s tax 
Recall that one necessary condition for liquidity traps to occur is the existence of a zero 
nominal interest bound. While the above policy propositions focus on unbinding the 
bound, some authors propose to break the bound through imposing Gesell’s tax on money 
(Buiter and Panigirtzoglou 2003; Goodfriend 2000). To tax money is effectively 
equivalent to creating inflation directly; hence Gesell’s tax can (in principle) fix liquidity 
traps in a way similar to a rise in inflation expectations.
7 The problem is its feasibility. 
The administration of Gesell’s tax could be challenging and costly (Buiter and 
Panigirtzoglou, 2003). Moreover, some political-economy obstacles and international 
complications need to be overcome before such a major change in institution becomes 
practical (Byrant, 2000).  
 
                                                 
7 See Goodfriend (2000) for comparison between inflation tax and Gesell’s tax.    - 12 -
3.  A simple way to prevent and fix liquidity traps 
Should there be no bound on the nominal interest rate, liquidity traps will not happen, 
because aggregate demand and supply can be balanced at negative nominal interest rates. 
Negative nominal interest rates imply negative nominal returns to capital.
8 Since earnings 
can hardly be negative, negative nominal returns to capital can only result from nominal 
capital price (denoted as Q) depreciation.  
Therefore, from a Q-perspective, liquidity traps will occur in the situation where the 
current equilibrium nominal capital price (i.e., the nominal capital price level that 
balances aggregate demand and supply) is not sustainable due to the expectation of low 
nominal capital price in the future, which could be caused by low future equilibrium 
nominal capital price, or by financial market’s “irrational despair”, or both.  
In short, according to a Q-perspective diagnosis, the root of liquidity traps is the 
(expectation of) low nominal capital price in the future. Then a straightforward 
prescription is to keep the future nominal capital price at a high level that can sustain the 
equilibrium nominal capital price in the present. This is not a difficult task for the central 
bank whose ability to supply money is (in principle) unlimited. One possible impact of 
keeping the future nominal capital price high is high future inflation. Yet this is a side 
effect that the central bank has to tolerate for the sake of preventing or escaping from 
liquidity traps.  
In the following we first examine the occurrence of liquidity traps in a formal model 
that incorporates capital price dynamics, and then based on which propose a simple way 
                                                 
8 For narrative convenience, we use capital as a general term for assets other than money and government 
bonds.     - 13 -
to prevent or fix liquidity traps. Finally, we compare our proposition to other propositions 
in the literature.  
 
The Model 
At the beginning of period t, a representative consumer holds a wealth portfolio that 
contains three assets: real capital (Kt), one-period nominal government bond (Dt), and 
money (Mt). Capital per se cannot be consumed; yet it provides capital owners with 
capital earnings (in terms of consumption) at the end of every period. Capital can also be 
exchanged for consumption or other assets. Bond is a one-period coupon bond 
denominated in money and issued by government. Money, issued by government, is a 
non-interest-bearing medium of exchange that provides liquidity services.    
The consumer supplies one unit of labor inelastically during period t and receives real 
wage income  t W  at the end of which.
9 After paying real lump-sum tax  t τ , the consumer 
decides period-t consumption  t C  and wealth portfolio { } 1 1 1 , , + + + t t t M D K  for period t+1, 
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where  t P  and  t q  are respectively the price of consumption (in terms of money) and the 
real price of capital (in terms of consumption) at the end of period t; whereas  t R  and  t i  
are respectively the earning rate of capital (Kt) and the interest rate of bond (Dt) during 
period t. 
                                                 
9 Here we do not consider consumer’s decision-making on labor supply for simplicity. Besides, the notion 
that the problem of insufficient demand can be solved by aggregate supply reduction through more 
voluntary unemployment is not appealing to us in the analysis of liquidity traps.   - 14 -
Assume perfect substitution between capital and bond; then the period-t real interest 
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where the middle term measures the real rate of return to capital; whereas the last term 
measures the real rate of return to bond.  
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measures the real value of consumer’s wealth portfolio at the end of period t-1 (or 
equivalently, the beginning of period t).  
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θ  is the time-preference parameter. For simplicity, assume log utility function 
() t t t P M C U / log log β + = , where β  is the liquidity-service parameter. Equation (3.5), 
derived from equations (3.3) and (3.6), is consumer’s lifetime budget constraint. Equation   - 15 -
(3.6) is the transversality condition that prohibits the consumer from accumulating 
infinite amount of debt.   
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Substituting equations (3.7) and (3.8) into equation (3.5) and using equation (3.6), we 
obtain the following lifecycle consumption function (see Mathematical Appendix A.1 for 
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Equation (3.9) shows that consumption at the end of period t (period-t consumption in 
short) is proportional to current wealth.  ) ) 1 ( (
1 − + = β θ ξ  is the consumption propensity 
out of wealth.  1 + t A  is the real non-human wealth at the end of period t; whereas Ht+1 is 
the real human wealth at the end of period t, measured by  
[] ∑ ∏
∞
































To solve the model analytically, we make the following simplifying yet common 
assumptions.  
Assume capital stock and (unit) capital earning are fixed at K  and R  respectively. 
Fixed capital and labor supplies imply fixed labor income W . Thus, aggregate supply is 
fixed at Y , i.e.,    - 16 -
W K R Y Yt + = =  (3.11) 
Assume that the total amount of government-issued assets is constant at D , i.e.,   
D D M t t = + .   (3.12) 
Also assume zero government expenditure; and hence the lump sum tax ( t τ ) will be used 
to finance bond interest payments, i.e.,  
t t t t D i P = τ .   (3.13) 
 
The equilibrium and steady state  
Denote the equilibrium at the end of period t as  














t M H q r i P C S , 
where 
e
t C , 
e
t P , 
e
t i 1 + , 
e
t r 1 + , 
e
t q , and 
e
t H 1 +  are endogenously determined; the money supply 
Mt+1 is a policy variable determined by the central bank; and ξ  is the consumption 
propensity parameter.   
Consumption is the only component of aggregate demand; thus the goods-market 
equilibrium condition is given by 
t t C Y ε + = , (3.14) 
where  t ε  is a stochastic demand shock with mean  0 = ε .  
The steady state of the economy, denoted as  { } ξ , ; , , , , , M H q r i P C S ≡ , is 
determined by the simultaneous equations (3.2), (3.8), (3.9), (3.10), (3.13), and (3.14). 
Note that a symbol without time-subscript represents the steady-state value of the 
variable. Solving the simultaneous equations gives the steady-state value of each variable 
as follows (see Mathematics Appendix A.2 for derivations).    - 17 -
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Zero-inflation Monetary Policy 
Equations (3.15)-(3.19) indicate money neutrality. Assume that the central bank pursues a 
zero-inflation policy by setting the money supply (Mt+1) to keep the price level (Pt) 
constant at P . According to equation (3.2), this zero-inflation monetary policy implies 










r i . (3.20) 
We will show that, under the zero-inflation monetary policy, a positive demand shock in 
the future can cause liquidity traps in the present.  
 
Liquidity traps 
Suppose a temporary and positive demand shock is expected to happen at the end of 
period T, which can be described as  Y T ε ε =  ( 1 0 < <ε )—assume that  0 = t ε  for  T t ≠ . 
We will show how a large  T ε  can cause liquidity traps prior to period T.    - 18 -
We start from examining the impact of  T ε  on the equilibrium at the end of period T, 














T + + + + ≡ . Note that the central bank’s zero-
inflation commitment endogenizes the money supply.  
Given fixed aggregate supply (Y ), monetary tightening is needed to dampen the 
inflation pressure caused by the positive demand shock ( T ε ).  The tightening will 
increase the interest rate ( i i
e
T > +1 ),
10 reduce the capital price ( q q
e
T < ) as well as the 
human wealth ( H H
e
T < +1 ). According to equation (3.9), the reduction in 
e
T q  and 
e
T H 1 +  
will reduce consumption ( C C
e
T < ) so as to accommodate the demand shock  T ε .
11 
Specifically, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1.  Given  the demand shock  0 > = Y T ε ε , the equilibrium real capital price 
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Corollary 1.  The greater the shock is, the lower the 
e
T q  will be ( 0 / < ∂ ∂ ε
e
T q) .  
Proof: See Mathematics Appendix A.3. 
 
                                                 
10 For narrative convenience, when the real and nominal interest rates are equal under zero inflation, we 
simply use “the interest rate” without specifying nominal or real; and in notation we use the symbol of the 
nominal interest rate (it).  
11 The “wealth effect” on consumption of interest-rate-induced changes in  T q  and  1 + T H  implicitly 
captures the interest-rate effect on consumption through the substitution effect. See Cai (2003) for 
discussion on monetary policy transmission from a wealth-effect perspective.    - 19 -
According to equation (3.20), a lower 
e
T q  will put downward pressure on  1 − T q . A 
decrease in the interest rate 
e
T i  can help releasing the pressure and keep  1 − T q  at its 
equilibrium level (
e
T q 1 − ). However, with a large demand shock  T ε , 
e
T q  could be reduced 
to such an extent that 
e
T q 1 −  is unsustainable even when the zero interest bound is binding. 
Then a liquidity trap will occur in period T-1 with insufficient demand and the interest 
rate bounded at zero.  
Letting 
1 − ≡ Y K R α  denotes the capital share, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2.  Given the demand shock  Y T ε ε = , the period-T equilibrium interest rate  
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> , then  0 <
e
T i.    
Proof: See Mathematics Appendix A.4.  
 
According to Corollary 2, with stable consumption price, a positive demand shock in 
period  T, if sufficiently enough (
1 ) 1 (
− + > α β θ ε ), will result in a negative natural 
nominal interest rate and hence a liquidity trap in period T-1.  
The liquidity trap in period T-1 implies that the nominal interest rate during period T 
is bound at zero (i.e.,  0 = T i ). Thus, according to equation (3.20),  1 − T q  is equal to 
R q
e
T + , higher than 
e
T q . However,  1 − T q  may not be high enough to sustain the 
equilibrium capital price at the end of period T-2 (
e
T q 2 − ). Therefore, period T-2 could also   - 20 -
be in the liquidity trap. So could be period T-3, and so on. In general, we have the 
following proposition. 
 







, then  0 1 < + −
e
n T i.  
Proof: See Mathematics Appendix A.5.  
 
Summary 
The expectation of a positive demand shock in the future could push the economy into a 
liquidity trap prior to the shock’s arrival. The greater the shock is, the longer the liquidity 
trap will be.
12 The trigger of the liquidity trap is a low capital price in the future, which is 
needed to release the inflation pressure caused by the demand shock.  However, the low 
future capital price could result in periods of capital price undervaluation (relative to its 
equilibrium level) and hence periods of insufficient demand.  
 
A simple way to avoid or escape from liquidity traps 
As capital price undervaluation is responsible for keeping the economy in liquidity traps, 
a natural way out is to support the capital price at its equilibrium level. With unlimited 
ability to supply money, the central bank is capable of supporting the nominal capital 
price at any level. Therefore, the central bank can make a credible commitment to defend 
a lower bound of nominal capital price, which will prevent (or fix) capital price 
undervaluation, and hence help avoiding (or escaping) liquidity traps. As the defended 
                                                 
12 Since a well-defined ε  cannot exceed unity, the “retroactive” process of the liquidity trap will 
eventually stop at some point m where  m T q −  is high enough to sustain 
e
m T q 1 − − . In another word,  T ε ∀ , 




m T i i m . In short, the liquidity trap will have a beginning.   - 21 -
lower nominal capital price bound could be incompatible with the current level of 
consumption price, inflation will be a potential side effect of avoiding or fixing liquidity 
traps in this way.  
Specifically, for the demand-shock-induced liquidity traps discussed in the above, we 
have the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 4.   The demand-shock-induced liquidity traps can be prevented or fixed by a 
lower nominal capital price bound at  q P Q
L 1 ) 1 (
− + = θ .  
 
To prove this proposition, we start from examining the impacts of a period-T demand 
shock on the equilibrium values of real variables.  
Given  Y T ε ε =  and  0 = ≠T t ε , equation (3.14) implies that the equilibrium 
consumption will be  Y C
e
T ) 1 ( ε − =  and  Y C
e
T t = ≠ .  
Thus, according to equation (3.7), the equilibrium real interest rate will be 
θ = − −∞ ∈
e
T t r ] 1 , ( ,  εθ ε θ − − =
e
T r ,  
1
1 ) 1 )( (
−
+ − + = ε ε θ
e
T r , and  θ = ∞ + ∈
e
T t r ) , 2 [ .  








1 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
− −
− − + − + = ε θ ε θ ,  q q q
e
T < − = ) 1 ( ε , and 
q q
e
T t = ∞ + ∈ ) , 1 [ .
13  
Recall that liquidity traps happen when the natural nominal interest rate becomes 
negative (i.e.  0 <
e
t i ). Since all but period-T equilibrium real interest rate are positive, 
                                                 
13 
e
t q  stays at its steady-state level (q) initially. At the time when the demand shock  T ε  is expected, 
e
t q will discretely rise above q, and then keeps appreciating till the end of period T-1. 
e
t q  will fall below q 
at the end of period T, then rises back to q at the end of period T+1 and stay there afterwards.     - 22 -
given no deflation,  0 <
e
t i  could only happen in period T. Thus, if a situation of  0 <
e
T i  
can be prevented (or fixed), liquidity traps will be avoided (or escaped).  





























T q P Q =  represents the equilibrium nominal capital price at the end of period T. 




T Q i . Thus, it is not difficult to verify that, given 
P P T = −1 , that 
L e
T Q Q ≥  will be a sufficient condition for  0 ≥
e
T i . Put plainly, with the 
period-T nominal capital price being lower bounded at 
L Q , the equilibrium nominal 
interest rate will not fall below zero; therefore, liquidity traps will not happen.   
In summary, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5.   While pure zero-inflation-targeting monetary policy will allow liquidity 
traps to happen when the period-T demand shock  T ε  is greater than  Y
1 ) 1 (
− +θ θ , zero-
inflation-targeting monetary policy with a prioritized commitment to defending the lower 
nominal capital price bound 
L Q  will prevent (or fix) the liquidity traps. The cost of the 
avoidance (or escape) is a permanent increase in price level from P  (before period T) to 
P P
1 ) 1 ( '
− − − + = εθ ε θ  from period T onwards.  
Proof: Since  εθ ε θ − − =
e
T r , if  Y T
1 ) 1 (
− + > θ θ ε , then  0 <
e
T r ; and hence a liquidity trap 




T q P Q ' =  (where  q q
e
T ) 1 ( ε − = ) is at its zero bound  q P Q
L 1 ) 1 (
− + = θ , 
it is not difficult to verify that  P P
1 ) 1 ( '
− − − + = εθ ε θ . 
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Discussion 
The above analysis from a Q-perspective diagnoses liquidity traps as resulting from 
capital price undervaluation that could be caused by the expectation of low capital price 
in the future. Accordingly, we propose that the central bank can prevent or cure liquidity 
traps by appending to its inflation-targeting policy with a prioritized commitment to 
defending a lower bound of nominal capital price. In the following we compare this 
proposition to its existing counterparts in the literature. 
To extract the economy out of liquidity traps, our proposition suggests increasing 
current capital price. This is similar to the suggestion of monetary transfer in that both of 
them serve the purpose of making consumers wealthier. Liquidity traps under the Q-
perspective are also “poverty traps” where capital price undervaluation makes consumers 
less wealthy than they should have been could the nominal interest rate be negative. As 
opposed to monetary transfer that creates more money as concrete purchasing power, 
increases in capital price can create potential purchasing power through capital 
revaluation.  
Our proposition involves monetary “intervention” to increase current capital price, 
which is in the same spirit as some unconventional monetary policy suggestions. The 
novelty of our proposition is to induce higher capital price through setting a lower bound 
for nominal capital price. If current capital price undervaluation is due to expected low 
capital price in the future, direct open-market purchases may force the central bank to 
acquire a large amount of capital before achieving the goal of increasing its price; 
whereas a credible promise to defend the lower bound could effectively save the central   - 24 -
bank from directly involving in the capital market.
14 The zero-interest policy can help 
sustaining a certain level of capital price, which could nevertheless still fall short of the 
equilibrium level because of risk or other premiums. In contrast, by promising to defend a 
properly-chosen lower nominal capital price bound, the central bank can effectively raise 
capital price to its equilibrium level.  
Expectation management is one of the key elements of our proposition. As opposed to 
the suggestion of managing inflation expectation, our suggestion is to manage the 
expectation on capital price. In the above model, if the central bank can generate the 
expectation of a permanent increase in the price level from P  to  ' P  at the end of period 
T, the result will be the same as our proposition. Yet, the difference is in what the central 
bank needs to do. According to our proposition, what the central bank needs to do is to 
promise to defend the lower bound 
L Q ; then it has no need to worry about the timing and 
magnitude of the shock  T ε . In contrast, inflation expectation management will require the 
central bank to inform consumers when the price will rise and by how much—note that 
P P
1 ) 1 ( '
− − − + = εθ ε θ  implies that the magnitude of necessary inflation is positively 
related to the magnitude of the demand shock.  
The central bank’s credibility is as essential for our proposition to work as it is for the 
propositions of inflation expectation management. In light of the fact that inflation tends 
to be a necessary cost of avoiding or fixing liquidity traps (from an ex ante point of 
view), we have no concern over central bank’s willingness to tolerate it. Moreover, the 
                                                 
14 Open-market purchases may be initially necessary to make a convincing case for the promise. After the 
credibility of the lower bound is established, central bank’s direct involvement in the capital market can be 
avoided.      - 25 -
central bank is not likely to break its promises because credibility is something too 
valuable to lose.   
Our proposition is (in rationale) similar to the exchange-rate proposition (in general) 
in that both involve monetary influence on asset prices. While the exchange-rate 
proposition suggests increasing the price of foreign currency in terms of home currency 
so as to stimulate foreign demands, our proposition suggests increasing the price of 
capital in terms of home currency so as to stimulate domestic demands.  
Our proposition is also similar to Svensson’s plan in that both involve using asset 
market to induce a desirable outcome in goods market. Yet, while Svensson’s plan will 
have negative impacts on aggregate demand if consumers do not cooperatively expect 
inflations, the increase in capital price in our proposition will be stimulating irrespective 
of consumers’ inflation expectations. Even if consumers do not believe in the central 
bank’s commitment to defending a lower nominal capital price bound, our proposition 
will be merely ineffective but not counterproductive.  
Finally, our proposition is conceptually similar to the proposition of Gesell’s tax. 
While the essence of taxing money is to make it as unattractive as other assets in terms of 
the real rate of return, the essence of defending a lower nominal capital price bound is to 
make other assets as attractive as money in terms of the nominal rate of return. These two 
different ways will lead to the same result that money will no longer be so attractive as to 
become a liquidity trap.  
 
Conclusion   - 26 -
Examining liquidity traps in a model that explicitly considers capital price dynamics, we 
find that a large positive aggregate demand shock in the future can cause long-lasting 
liquidity traps prior to the arrival of the shock. We propose that the central bank can 
prevent or fix such liquidity traps by committing to defending a lower bound of nominal 
capital price. The rationale of our proposition is to use the lower bound to prevent the 
natural nominal interest rate from falling below zero. Thus our proposition is in principle 
applicable to liquidity traps caused by any reason.  
Considering the fact that severe capital market meltdowns are the immediate causes 
for Japan being in a liquidity trap and the United States on the verge of one, our 
proposition appears to be a promising way to prevent or fix liquidity traps. Therefore, 
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Mathematics Appendix 
A.1  The Derivations of Equations (3.7)-(3.9) 
Some first-order conditions of the utility maximization problem are  ) 1 (
1
t t r C + =
− λ ,  




+ + + = + t t t r r C λ θ , and  t t t t P r i M ) 1 ( ) (
1 1 + =
− − λ β ; based on which equations 
(3.7) and (3.8) are not difficult to derive.  
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which can be rearranged into  
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which, together equation (3.8) and some rearrangement, will give equation (3.9).  
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A.2  The Derivations of the Steady State 
According to equation (3.2), the steady-state nominal and real interest rates are equal and  
given by  
q
R
r i = = , (A.2.1) 





=  (A.2.2) 
According to equations (3.8), (3.13), and (3.14), the steady-state money supply, tax, and 
consumption are given by 
1 − = Ci P M β , 
1 − = iDP τ , and  Y C =  respectively, which, 
together with equations (3.9), (A.2.1), and (A.2.2), will allow us to solve the steady-state 
interest rate as  θ = = r i . Then, the steady-state values for other variables are 
straightforward to derive.  
 
A.3  The Proof of Proposition 1 
Since the demand shock  0 > = Y T ε ε  is temporary, the economy will be in the steady 
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A.4  The Proof of Proposition 2 
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A.5  The Proof of Proposition 3 
  Suppose the economy is in liquidity traps from period T-n+1 to period T-1; then, 
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which implies that  []
1
1 ) 1 ( ) (
−
+ − + − + < β εα β θ n i
e








0 1 < + −
e
n T i . 
   - 31 -
References 
Adam, K., Billi, R., 2003. Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment with a Zero Bound on 
Nominal Interest Rates. CEPR Discussion Paper, No. 4111. 
Auerbach, A., Obstfeld, M., 2003. The Case for Open-Market Purchases in a Liquidity Trap. 
NBER Working Paper 9814. 
Benhabib, J., Schmitt-Grohe, S., Uribe, M., 2002. Avoiding Liquidity Traps. Journal of Political 
Economy 110, 535-563. 
Bernanke, B., Reinhart, V., 2004. Conducting Monetary Policy at Very Low Short-Term Interest 
Rates. Lecture at the International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, Geneva, 
January. 
Bryant, R., 2000. Comment on Overcoming the Zero Bound on Interest Rate Policy. Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking 32, 1037-1050. 
Buiter, W., 2003. Deflation: Prevention and Cure. NBER Working Paper 9623. 
Buiter, W., Panigirtzoglou, N., 2003. Overcoming the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates 
with Negative Interest on Currency: Gesell's Solution. Economic Journal 113, 723-746. 
Cai, J., 2003. Fundamental Paper Wealth and Monetary Policy. Http://ssrn.com/abstract=440700. 
Christiano, L., 2000. Comment on Theoretical Analysis Regarding a Zero Lower Bound on 
Nominal Interest Rates. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 32, 905-930. 
Clouse, J., Henderson, D., Orphanides, A., Small, D., Tinsley, P. A., 2003. Monetary Policy 
When the Nominal Short-Term Interest Rate is Zero. Topics in Macroeconomics 3, no. 1, 
Article 12. 
Coenen, G., Wieland, V., 2003. The Zero-Interest-Rate Bound and the Role of the Exchange Rate 
for Monetary Policy in Japan. Journal of Monetary Economics 50, 1071-1101. 
Eggertsson, G., 2003. How to Fight Deflation in a Liquidity Trap: Committing to Being 
Irresponsible. IMF Working Paper WP/03/64. 
Eggertsson, G., Woodford, M., 2003. The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary 
Policy. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 139-211. 
Friedman, B., 2003. The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy: Comments. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 212-219. 
Goodfriend, M., 2000. Overcoming the Zero Bound on Interest Rate Policy. Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking 32, 1007-35. 
Krugman, P., 1998. It's Baaack: Japan's Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 2, 137-87.   - 32 -
McCallum, B., 2000. Theoretical Analysis Regarding a Zero Lower Bound on Nominal Interest 
Rates. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 32, 870-904. 
Meltzer, A., 2001. Monetary Transmission at Low Inflation: Some Clues from Japan in the 
1990s. Monetary and Economic Studies 19 (special edition), 13-34. 
Stevens, G., 2001. The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way of Escaping from a 
Liquidity Trap: Comment. Monetary and Economic Studies 19 (special edition), 313-316. 
Svensson, L., 2001. The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way of Escaping from a 
Liquidity Trap, Monetary and Economic Studies 19 (special edition), 277-312. 
Svensson, L., 2003. Escaping from a Liquidity Trap and Deflation: The Foolproof Way and 
Others. Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 145-166. 
Swank, J., 2001. The Zero Bound in an Open Economy: A Foolproof Way of Escaping from a 
Liquidity Trap: Comment, Monetary and Economic Studies 19 (special edition), 317-319. 
Ullersma, C. A., 2002. The Zero Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rates and Monetary Policy 
Effectiveness: A Survey. De Economist 150, 273-297. 
Wolman, A., 2004. Real Implications of the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates. Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking (forthcoming). 
Woodford, M., 2003. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
 